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I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine being fired by your employer for either getting
married or turning the age of thirty-five. The employer informs you
that the reason you are being fired is because you are no longer
attractive to the customer base who want to be serviced by
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unmarried and “available” young women.1 Moreover, suppose that
there was no such anti-marriage policy or termination-at-agethirty-five policy within the company for men.2 The employer does
not mind at all if men marry or work past the age of thirty-five.3
The employer explains the company will not be viable if the product,
the female employee, comes in “gray packaging.”4
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides (“Title VII”),
in pertinent part, that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment
practice . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of .
. . race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]”5 Would the
employees in the scenario above have a legal claim under the
language of this law? Could an employer in that scenario have a
viable defense by arguing that it was not sex discrimination to fire
women for getting married, but rather marriage discrimination?6
And, since marriage discrimination is not protected under Title VII,
how could the employer’s argument fail?7
* Christopher Dallas, Juris Doctor Candidate 2022, UIC School of Law. I
would like to thank each and every person that spent countless hours selflessly
working alongside me to create this article. This article would simply not be
what it is without the thoughtful consideration that so many wonderful people
provided.
1. See Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 781, 781-83 (E.D. La.
1967) (explaining that Delta’s policy was that a stewardess must have good
complexion, be neat, attractive, and possess good moral character).
2. Id. at 783.
3. Id. at 782.
4. Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1352 (2012) (quoting Transcript of Testimony Heard
Before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, on September 12,
1967 at 78 (statement of Walter Rauscher)). “Gray packaging” is a derogatory
term essentially reducing a woman’s value to the company to her youth and
beauty. Id.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2022).
6. See Cooper, 274 F. Supp. at 783 (stating that the plaintiff’s argument
about how it was sex discrimination – not marriage discrimination – was faulty
since the “discrimination lies in the fact that the plaintiff is married”).
7. Id. This argument was in fact persuasive to the court in Cooper and the
court used it as the basis for its holding, which denied the plaintiff a cause of
action expressly because this conduct was discrimination based on one’s marital
status. Id. Because marital status is not a protected class under Title VII, the
plaintiff’s claim was not proper. Id. Airlines almost exclusively hired only
women by the mid 1960s. Franklin, supra note 4, at 1348. Airlines would argue
that because they only hired female flight attendants, then they could not
possibly be discriminating because of sex because women being discriminated
against women does not create a disparity between men and women. Sprogis v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1203 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, C.J.,
dissenting). Additionally, the Fifth Circuit initially entertained the notion that
only hiring females to be flight attendants was a bona fide occupational
qualification (“BFOQ”), which essentially cemented the requisite for a flight
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It would seem self-evident that the policy above is
discrimination based on sex. It is sex discrimination when an
employer discharges a female employee for getting married, yet it
is permissible for male employees to get married.8 In essence, each
individual female employee is subjected to discriminatory
treatment when she gets married because of her sex. Such a
scenario requires little thought and compels the conclusion that the
employment practice is unlawful discrimination because of sex
pursuant to Title VII. How could a court conclude that this is not
sex discrimination and assert that Title VII was not meant to
protect this “form” of discrimination?
But in fact, it took years of incremental litigation for courts to
recognize such claims as violations of Title VII.9 This is in large part
due to the confusion behind the phrase “discrimination because of
sex.” Courts have struggled to apply Title VII in sex discrimination
cases.10 The meaning has been hard to define, and courts have little
instruction from the legislative history.11 Courts are not the only
adjudicative bodies that have struggled with the phrase.12 The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) was
unprepared for the substantial number of complex claims that were
filed the year Title VII went into effect.13 Significantly, no one at the
EEOC was familiar with how to resolve sex discrimination claims,
and it was not until Title VII went into effect that governing bodies
began to realize the significant impact of adding the word “sex” to

attendant to being a female. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 311 F.
Supp. 559 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev’d 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that
women are psychologically more able and fitted for being flight attendants,
making the job of stewardess a BFOQ, which was eventually overturned on
appeal to the Fifth Circuit).
8. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 959, 961 (N.D. Ill. 1970),
aff’d, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
9. See Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1197-98 (holding that discrimination based on
marriage was discrimination based on sex). It took seven years for courts to
acknowledge this as a form of sex discrimination. Id. Female flight attendants
began filing complaints about these policies from the outset of Title VII’s
enactment. KATHLEEN M. BARRY, FEMININITY IN FLIGHT: A HISTORY OF FLIGHT
ATTENDANTS 7 (Duke Univ. Press 2007).
10. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (concluding
“we are left with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act’s
prohibition against discrimination based on ‘sex’”).
11. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975)
(“We discover, as have other courts earlier considering the problem before us,
that the meager legislative history . . . provides slim guidance for divining
Congressional intent.”); see also Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748,
750 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting the lack of clear instruction from legislative history).
12. Franklin, supra note 4, at 1329.
13. Id. at 1334-35.
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Title VII would have on the traditions and culture of the country.14
The past fifty-six years of litigation over the meaning of the
phrase “discrimination because of sex” has culminated in the
United States Supreme Court’s landmark case of Bostock v. Clayton
County, Georgia.15 The Court held that employment discrimination
against one for being gay or transgender is discrimination “because
of sex.”16 Bostock now makes one’s sexual orientation or
transgender status protected under Title VII.17 This ruling is of
paramount importance to those who have viewed discrimination
“because of sex” to always have included sexual orientation and
transgender status. Employers can no longer terminate, refuse to
hire, or otherwise affect the employment conditions of employees
and prospective employees on account of one’s sexual orientation or
gender status.18
To understand how the Supreme Court reached its ruling, it is
important to understand the structure of a plaintiff’s argument in
a discrimination case under Title VII. Whether the case concerns a
woman being required to make greater contributions to a company’s
pension plan relative to men, or suing an ex-employer for being
terminated based on the employee’s sexual orientation, cases based
on discrimination all share a similar pattern.19 Plaintiffs will
advocate the court to interpret the conduct under a broad concept of
sex, similar to the way in which a court would interpret race
discrimination.20
In opposition, defendants will advocate for the court to
narrowly characterize the employer’s reason and demonstrate how
such characterization is unrelated to sex.21 Defendants will argue
14. Id. at 1335-36.
15. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (holding sexual
orientation and transgender status are protected under Title VII’s prohibition
against discrimination “because of sex”).
16. Id. at 1737.
17. Id. at 1754.
18. Id.
19. Compare Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 107 (2d Cir. 2018)
(explaining how plaintiff argues that sexual orientation is necessarily attached
to “sex” and they cannot be separated), with City of Los Angeles, Dep’t of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716 (1978) (requiring females to pay more
into the company pension plan necessarily discriminates based on sex even if
the basis for the policy is that women have a longer life expectancy; life
expectancy of a women necessarily factors in the sex of the individual).
Essentially, the arguments are similar in the sense that the plaintiff will show
how the reasoning that the employer focuses on, such as life expectancy or
sexual orientation, is an inextricably intertwined facet of sex.
20. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing that
discrimination on the basis of the race whom one associates with is a form of
race discrimination).
21. Brief for Petitioners Altitude Express, Inc., and Ray Maynard at 16-8,

361

UIC Law Review

[55:357

for a strict interpretation of the statutory language that excludes
their narrow characterization of the conduct and will reference a
lack of legislative history in support of a rigid and narrow reading
of discrimination.22 Significantly, there has been a misconception
with respect to the legislative history that has led courts throughout
the country to narrow the scope of the statute at the expense of a
plaintiff’s claim.23
Part II will lay out the purpose behind key components of Title
VII with respect to sex discrimination. Moreover, Part II will
explore the battle to incorporate “sex” into Title VII and how the
legislative history can be quite illustrative as to the legislature’s
intent, despite appearances to the contrary. It will also detail the
landmark Supreme Court cases that paved the way for the Court to
conclude that gay and transgender people are protected under Title
VII’s sex discrimination provision. Further, Part II will explain how
the three cases decided in Bostock reached the Supreme Court.
Part III will discuss the majority opinion’s reasoning and
demonstrate how the majority encompassed a broad interpretation
of the concept of “sex.” Part III will also consider some of the
prevalent arguments that supported the majority opinion, but were
left out of Justice Gorsuch’s opinion, such as the associational
discrimination argument. In addition, Part III will also discuss
Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, as well as some of the arguments
made in the lower courts that would support Justice Alito’s opinion.
For instance, Justice Alito explained that the definition of “sex” in
1964 did not incorporate sexual orientation and transgender
status.24 Additionally, Part III will discuss Justice Kavanaugh’s
dissent with respect to how the Court incorrectly applied the literal
meaning of Title VII rather than the ordinary meaning is
discussed.25
Finally, Part IV will demonstrate that courts have been
analyzing sex discrimination cases in a manner inconsistent with
the other protected classes of Title VII, such as race and religion;
and that Justice Gorsuch’s opinion was the correct interpretation of
Title VII sex discrimination. In essence, the judiciary has
historically interpreted the scope of “sex” disproportionately
narrower when compared to the concept of “race,” “religion,” or
other protected classes of Title VII. Courts moving forward will need
to analyze “sex” more symmetrically with the other protected
classes of Title VII in order to fulfill the intent of Congress.
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (No. 17-1623).
22. Id. at 46.
23. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1090.
24. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1756 (Alito, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).

2022]

The Plain Meaning of Sex

II.

362

BACKGROUND

A. The Legislative Purpose of Title VII’s Sex
Amendment
Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
prevent employers from making employment decisions that were
based on trivial characteristics that had no bearing on
qualifications for employment.26 In removing such trivial
characteristics from employment decisions, the legislation
effectively facilitates a merit-based workplace.27
Virginia Congressman Howard W. Smith proposed “sex” as a
class as a floor amendment towards the end of the legislative
debate.28 “Sex” was added into Title VII as a protected class
alongside race, color, religion, and national origin.29 However, the
reasons behind his motive are subject to different accounts.30 One
account purports that Congressman Smith was a fervent
segregation proponent, and by proposing “sex” into Title VII,
Congressman Smith believed he could poison the bill to such an
extent that even progressive congressmen would ultimately reject
the legislation.31 This account puts forth the notion that
Congressman Smith intended to merely kill the Civil Rights Act of
1964 by adding “sex” to Title VII.32
On the contrary, there is evidence that the National Women’s
26. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1971).
27. William N. Eskridge Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex
Discrimination Argument for LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322,
334 (2017).
28. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (statement of Rep. Smith).
29. Id.
30. Robert C. Bird, More Than A Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the
Legislative History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137, 137-38 (1997).
31. Franklin, supra note 4, at 1317-18.
32. Id. This account has perpetuated through much of the judicial history
and it became the narrative of the origins of the Sex Amendment in large part
due to the EEOC’s much publicized view that the Sex Amendment was a joke.
Vicki Shultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. UNIV. L. REV. 995,
1015-16 (2015). The EEOC did not view sex as a real form or persistent form of
discrimination compared to race or national origin. Id. In fact, the EEOC
Executive Director Powers was concerned that the commission would be known
as the “sex commission.” Id. The media also participated in the view that the
sex amendment was a joke – the New Republic called the sex amendment a
“mischievous joke;” the New York Times called it the “Bunny Law.” Id. at 102021.
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Party (“NWP”) advanced the idea of adding sex as a protected class
to the pending Act.33 The NWP had strong relationship with
Congressman Smith, who was the Chairman of the House and
Rules Committee.34 Aware of Smith’s strong opposition to the Civil
Rights legislation, the NWP approached him and made their
request in a manner that appealed to the Congressman’s agenda.35
Congressman Smith proposed his amendment at the floor debate on
February 8, 1964.36 It was met with such disbelief that
Congressman Smith was not taken seriously and had to wait for the
laughter to subside in order to explain himself.37
Once Congressman Smith proposed the amendment, he sat
back and allowed the members of the legislative debate to make the
next move.38 Congresswoman Martha Griffiths rose in ardent
support of the amendment.39 Congresswoman Griffiths posed the
question of the breadth and reach of the bill to Congressman
Emmanuel Celler:
Mrs. GRIFFITHS: Mr. Chairman, is it your judgment that this bill
will protect colored men and colored women at the hiring gate
equally?
Mr. CELLER: This bill is all-embracing and will cover everybody in
the United States.
Mrs. GRIFFITHS: It will cover every colored man and every colored
woman?
Mr. CELLER: Yes, it will cover white men and white women and all
Americans.40

In response, Congresswoman Griffiths raised the issue that in
the event the bill was passed without the addition of sex, Black
women would be protected, but “white women would be the last at
33. Bird, supra note 30, at 149.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 149-50. Once Congressman Smith acclimated to the idea, he
realized it was a win-win situation for him because the legislation would either
fail and not be enacted or at the very least, white women would be protected
under the legislation. Id. One of the concerns of the Civil Rights legislation was
that men, Black men, and Black women would be protected, but white women
would be excluded. 110 CONG. REC. 2579-80 (1964) (statement of Rep. Griffiths).
Interestingly enough, the strongest opposition to the sex amendment as it was
called, came from strong proponents of the Act who were committed to the cause
of civil rights equality. Franklin, supra note 4, at 1320.
36. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (statement of Rep. Smith).
37. Bird, supra note 30, at 151. The Congressman was a long-time member
of the House of Representatives and was a brilliant political tactician who could
pull the right procedural strings to kill bills that he opposed. Id.
38. Id. at 155.
39. 110 CONG. REC. 2578 (1964) (statement of Rep. Griffiths).
40. Id.
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the hiring gate.”41 Congresswoman Griffiths’ arguments garnered
strong support within the House, and she also brought focus to the
issue of women being treated as second class citizens.42 By the end
of the debate, all suspicions of Congressman Smith’s motives were
absolved and replaced with the sober realization of what the
consequence would be if sex was left unprotected under Title VII –
white women would be left behind and would be bootstrapped into
a role of inferiority under age-old traditional caste hierarchies.43
The debate ended with the House members contemplating this
potential reality, and the Sex Amendment passed 168 to 133.44
Those who believe Congressman Smith proposed sex to Title
VII to do more than just kill the bill argue that the House of
Representatives had refused multiple amendments that were
offered in an attempt to stall or destroy the bill with unpopular
provisions on multiple occasions.45 Additionally, many members
showed up solely to vote in favor of the Title VII Sex Amendment,
which garnered the largest count of votes that day.46 The House of
Representatives ultimately approved the Sex Amendment twice; by
the time it was passed for a second time, it was well known by that
point that the Civil Rights Act was going to pass.47

B. The Confusion Behind Sex Discrimination
One of the greatest sources of strain on judges and officials
alike is that Title VII does not define sex discrimination.48 This has
41. Bird, supra note 30, at 156.
42. Id. Congresswoman Griffiths proposed the hypothetical to Congressman
Celler to illustrate how white women would be left unprotected if sex was not
included into Title VII that if a Black woman applied to a restaurant that had
all white employees, then that woman would have a claim under Title VII. Id.
But, if a white woman applied to the same restaurant, then she would not have
a claim under Title VII. Id.
43. Id. at 157.
44. 110 CONG. REC. 2584 (1964). Once the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
passed, it was largely believed that the addition of sex to Tile VII was a joke.
Gerald N. Rosenberg, The 1964 Civil Rights Act: The Crucial Role of Social
Movements in the Enactment and Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Law,
49 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L. J. 1147, 1151-52 (2005). The first Executive Director of
the EEOC, Herman Edelsberg, remarked publicly that the sex amendment was
a “fluke” that was “conceived out of wedlock.” Id. at 1152. Mr. Edelsberg also
remarked that men were “entitled” to female secretaries. Id.
45. Shultz, supra note 32, at 1018-19.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 362 (7th
Cir. 2017) (Sykes, J., dissenting). In 1966, the National Organization for Women
(“NOW”) was founded with the intent to create an organization of feminist
lawyers that would embark on a campaign to persuade the government and the

365

UIC Law Review

[55:357

required courts to make educated guesses on the complex array of
sex discrimination issues49 that have landed on the steps of the
EEOC the day after Title VII went into effect.50 Courts used the lack
of legislative history to, more or less, fill in the blank of what they
believed Congress intended.51
Three cases demonstrate the difficulty courts have
encountered in defining sex discrimination. In 1976, in Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Gilbert, the Supreme Court upheld an employment policy that
allowed General Electric to exclude pregnancy benefits from their
health care and disability benefits program.52 Reversing the
decisions of both the district court and Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the Court argued that there was no discrimination to the
class of women because the class being affected was a class that only
affected women (being pregnant), while the other class contained

public that sex discrimination was a systemic problem within American culture.
Franklin, supra note 4, at 1342. NOW influenced many proponents of the sex
amendment in Congress and other feminists and strongly advocated that
discrimination because of sex occurred when forced individuals to conform to
traditional stereotypes of sex and family roles or “relegated an entire class to
an inferior status.” Id. at 1343-44.
49. Eskridge Jr., supra note 27, at 335. Those who assert that Congress did
not contemplate sexual orientation during the Act’s passage in 1964 cite to the
fact that homosexuality was illegal and considered a mental illness in medical
literature. Id. These individuals argue that Congress would not protect
something that was illegal at the time. Id. At the time of Title VII’s enactment,
homosexuality was considered a mental illness and was also illegal in every
state but Illinois which did not consider homosexuality to be sodomy. Id.; see
Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 118 (1967) (stating that homosexuality is an
affliction of “psychopathic personality”); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 661
(2015) (noting that “when the American Psychiatric Association published the
first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1952,
homosexuality was classified as a mental disorder, a position adhered to until
1973”).
50. BARRY, supra note 9, at 7.
51. Diaz v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971) (“In
attempting to read Congress’ intent [regarding sex discrimination] . . . it is
reasonable to assume, from a reading of the statute itself, that one of Congress’
main goals was to provide equal access to the job market for both men and
women.”). Courts initially believed that purpose of the sex amendment was to
create equal employment opportunities between men and women, and
frequently rejected claims of sexual harassment, retaliation for refusing sexual
advances, etc. Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz.
1975). “It would be ludicrous to hold that the sort of activity involved here was
contemplated by the Act” and would open the floodgates to litigation every time
an employer made sexual advances. Id. Another court has stated that Title VII
“is not intended to provide a federal tort remedy for what amounts to physical
attack motivated by sexual desire.” Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422
F. Supp. 553, 556 (D. N.J. 1976).
52. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 128 (1976).
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men and women (non-pregnant women).53 Justice William Brennan
dissented and criticized the majority for making it permissible for a
private employer to “adopt a disability plan that compensates
employees for all temporary disabilities except one affecting
exclusively women, pregnancy.”54 Justice Brennan was particularly
disturbed by the majority’s glossing over of the district court’s
finding that determined General Electric had a discriminatory
intent to exclude pregnancy from the disability benefits.55 He was
further concerned with the majority’s interpretation that this was a
gender-neutral policy and was characterized as pregnancy
discrimination, rather than sex discrimination.56 Justice John Paul
Stevens, also dissenting, argued that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy was by definition, discrimination on account of sex, “for
it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates
the female from the male.”57
In 1978, in City of L.A., Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart,
female employees of the city brought a class action suit against their
employer for requiring female employees to pay approximately
fifteen percent more than males into the company pension plan.58
The Department argued that the classification for different
contributions was based on statistical evidence of longevity, rather
than sex.59 In other words, because women statistically live longer
than men, women should pay more into the pension plan because
they will likely draw from the fund for a longer period of time.60 The
Court rejected this argument, holding that this was discrimination
because of sex.61 The Court reasoned that statistical data based on
sex necessarily encompasses sex as defined in Title VII.62 Moreover,

53. Id. at 135. The majority emphasized the district court’s finding that
pregnancy is not a disease because it is often a voluntarily undertaken and
desired condition. Id. at 136 (citing Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367,
377 (E.D. Va. 1974)). Because the court distinguished pregnancy from the
“typical” disease covered under a disabilities policy, the majority concluded that
General Electric did not act under a pretext of discriminating against women
as a class, which was how the statute was read at the time. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at
136; see Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,
681 (1983) (explaining that “[p]roponents of the legislation stressed throughout
the debates that Congress had always intended to protect all individuals from
sex discrimination in employment”) (emphasis in original).
54. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 146 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 149-52.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 704-05.
59. Id. at 712.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 712-13.
62. Id.
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the Department argued that there was an “absence of a
discriminatory effect on women as a class.”63 The Court rejected this
argument as well, stating that the practice, “discriminated against
every individual woman employed by the Department” compared to
their male colleagues.64
Congress addressed the judiciary’s struggle to develop a
consistent definition of sex discrimination.65 In response to Gilbert,
Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.66 A
bipartisan Congressional coalition expressly admonished the
Supreme Court’s holding and went as far to say that the Court was
misguided, and “disregarded the intent of Congress enacting Title
VII.”67 Moreover, Congress endorsed the dissenters’ reasoning and
asserted that “[t]he majority erred in finding that the exclusion of
pregnancy disability coverage was a nondiscriminatory policy . . . it
is the committee’s view that the dissenting justices correctly
interpreted the act.”68 Congress believed that the majority in
Gilbert viewed sex discrimination too narrowly, and that Title VII
was intended to be interpreted broadly.69 In agreeing with Justice
Brennan’s dissent, Congress approved of Justice Brennan’s
reasoning, which was centered around “the broad social objectives
of Title VII.”70
In 1989, courts were further confronted with the ambiguities
of what qualified as sex discrimination in Price Waterhouse v.

63. Id. at 716. The Department’s argument is that because women as a class
are being treated equally with one another, the pension policy that
discriminates against each individual woman, on its face, is justified. Id. Title
VII expressly states that it is unlawful to discriminate “against any individual.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2022).
64. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 716. The Department used a relatively simple table
that indicated women lived longer than men. Id. at 705. As pointed out in
Manhart’s brief, the statistics that the Department relied on failed to even
consider other notable relevant factors, “such as smoking and drinking habits,
normality of weight, prior medical history and family longevity history.” Brief
for Respondents at 7, City of Los Angeles, Dep’t of Water and Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702 (1978) (No. 76-1810).
65. Eskridge Jr., supra note 27, at 354. Women’s groups eventually took
their claims to Congress as a result of Supreme Court rulings in Gilbert. Id.
66. Franklin, supra note 4, at 1366-67.
67. Eskridge Jr., supra note 27, at 354.
68. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 2 (1978). The House Report also indicates
Congress’s intent to give deference to the EEOC. Id. “The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, charged with implementation of Title VII,
interpreted the Act to include discrimination based on pregnancy.” Id. In 1972,
the EEOC established guidelines which stated that disabilities attributed to
pregnancy such as, abortion, miscarriage, and childbirth recovery should be
protected under an employment disability program. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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Hopkins, where the Supreme Court faced the question of whether
sex stereotyping was a form of sex discrimination.71 In that case,
Ms. Hopkins sued her employer for sex discrimination, while being
for a promotion to partner at the Price Waterhouse accounting
firm.72 Initially, Ms. Hopkins was neither accepted nor denied a
promotion to partner.73 Instead, her candidacy was left untouched
until it was eventually rejected.74 Ms. Hopkins alleged in her
complaint that she was refused a promotion because some of her
supervisors and colleagues referred to her as too “macho,” that she
“overcompensated for being a woman,” and that she “should walk
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear
make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”75 The Court held
that employers could not rely on sex stereotypes or insist that an
employee “match[] the stereotype associated with their group.”76
Justice Brennan reasoned that when Congress prohibited
employers from discriminating against individuals because of their
sex, its intent was to prohibit the entire scope of disparate
treatment of men and women that resulted from sex stereotypes.77
After Hopkins, additional confusion arose when gay and
transgender individuals brought Title VII sex discrimination claims
against employers under the theory of failing to comply with sex
stereotypes – a gay man does not comply with the stereotype of a
man who is expected to be attracted to women.78 The federal circuit
courts have been receptive to the reasoning that an employee can
state a valid claim for sex discrimination under Title VII for not

71. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
72. Id. at 231-32.
73. Id. at 231.
74. Id.
75. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1116-18 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (“[I]ndeed, the subtle and unconscious discrimination created by sex
stereotyping appears to be a major impediment to Title VII’s goals of ensuring
equal employment opportunities”).
76. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 251.
77. See id. (explaining that an employer places an employee in an impossible
Catch-22 when an employer objects to a female employee’s aggressiveness when
the job itself requires aggressiveness: “out of a job if they behave aggressively
and out of a job if they do not”) (citing Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198).
78. See Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2017)
(holding that discrimination based on the failure to conform to gender norms,
such as being gay or transgender is actionable); see Nichols v. Azteca Rest.
Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that harassment and
degrading comments against an employee for failing to comply with gender
stereotypes was sex discrimination as described in Hopkins); and see EEOC v.
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 575 (6th Cir. 2018)
(holding that discrimination based on an employee’s transgender status is
always based on gender stereotypes and actionable under Title VII).
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conforming to gender stereotypes.79 However, courts were required
to overcome substantial obstacles in order to draw a logical line
between sex stereotyping for gender nonconformity, which is
protected by Title VII, and sexual orientation discrimination, which
was viewed at the time as unprotected.80
It was not until 2017 when the Seventh Circuit held, sitting en
banc, that sexual orientation was recognized as being
discrimination because of sex.81 In Hively v. Ivy Tech Community
College, Professor Hively was a part-time adjunct professor who
filed a claim alleging that she was denied full-time employment
because she was a lesbian.82 The majority implemented use of what
is known as the “Comparator Test” to reason that if Hively was a
male attracted to a female, she would not have been denied fulltime employment and would not have been fired.83 Accordingly,
Hively was discriminated against because she is a woman attracted
to women.84
The Comparator Test that the Seventh Circuit implemented is
a method used to determine whether the trait that was
discriminated against was a pretext for sex by asking the question:
whether the employer would have treated their employee

79. EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 689 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 2012); Hunter v.
United Parcel Service, Inc., 697 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2012); Evans, 850 F.3d at
1254; Nichols, 256 F.3d at 875; R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d at
575.
80. Hively, 853 F.3d at 342; see generally De Santis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.,
608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (refusing to extend Title VII to sexual orientation
discrimination under the basis of sex discrimination).
81. Hively, 853 F.3d at 339. The Seventh Circuit in Hively was the first
federal circuit court to recognize that sexual orientation discrimination was
discrimination on the basis of sex. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 107-09.
82. Hively, 853 F.3d at 341.
83. Id. at 345. The majority based their analysis on the following principles:
(1) the statutory text is unambiguous; (2) because legislative history is
malleable, little deference should be given to Congress’s failure to change the
law; (3) the EEOC had recently endorsed the notion in 2015 that sex
discrimination encompasses sexual orientation discrimination; and (4) Supreme
Court precedent that “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil
to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our
laws rather than the principal concerns of the legislators by which we are
governed.” Id. at 344-46; see Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080,
2015 WL 4397641 (July 15, 2015) (stating that allegations of discrimination
because of sexual orientation are necessarily attached to sex discrimination and
therefore, state a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII); see also Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998) (stating that
Title VII does not bar a sex discrimination claim of same-sex sexual harassment
against a male even though it may not have been Congress’s principal concern
incorporating sex into the Act).
84. Hively, 853 F.3d at 341 (emphasis added).
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differently but for that employee’s sex.85 It essentially tries to
isolate and identify the cause of the employer’s action.86 The test is
useful in determining whether a specific trait is a function of sex,
which would make it a subset of sex thereby afforded protection
under Title VII.87 To perform the Comparator Test in Professor
Hively’s case, one would compare Professor Hively to an identical
counter-part who is a male.88 Compare Professor Hively, who is a
female attracted to females, to a male professor who is attracted to
females.89 Making this comparison, the Seventh Circuit reasoned
that Professor Hively’s sexual orientation was a subset of sex
because an otherwise identical male employee who was attracted to
females would not have been discriminated against.90
The Seventh Circuit further added that because the line
between a gender nonconformity claim and a sexual orientation
discrimination claim is so thin, it does not exist at all.91 Judge Sykes
wrote a particularly sharp dissent critiquing the majority of
updating legislation, going so far as to say that the majority
implemented “a statutory amendment courtesy of unelected
judges.”92 Judge Sykes argued that the majority used the
Comparator Test incorrectly and the proper framework for the test
would be comparing a male who is attracted to a male to a female
attracted to a female.93 Since an employer would fire them both, it
would not be discrimination.94
Professor Hively was the first; Ms. Stephens, Mr. Bostock, and
Mr. Zarda soon followed.95

85. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711.
86. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 119.
87. Id. at 118.
88. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345-46.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 346. Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit recognized that Hively’s
claim was no different than cases where women were historically rejected for
employment in fields that were traditionally male situated. Id. (citing Phillips
v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); see also Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198
(“[C]ongress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes”).
92. Hively, 853 at 360 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 365.
94. Id.
95. Mr. Zarda’s claim actually precedes Ms. Hively who filed suit in 2013.
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., No. 3:14-cv-1791, 2015 WL 926015, at *1 (N.D.
Ind. 2015). Mr. Zarda was terminated in the summer of 2010 and filed a charge
with the EEOC shortly thereafter. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 108-09.
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C. Procedural History of Bostock v. Clayton County,
Georgia
In hearing Bostock, the Supreme Court consolidated the cases
of Ms. Stephens, Mr. Bostock, and Mr. Zarda, which all dealt with
sexual orientation or sex stereotyping discrimination.96 By the time
that these three cases reached the Supreme Court, none of the
employers contested that any of the plaintiffs were terminated
based on their sexual orientation or transgender status.97
1.

Ms. Stephens

Ms. Stephens was a transgender person and had a female
gender identity, meaning that she was assigned the male sex at
birth.98 Ms. Stephens worked in the funeral industry over the course
of nearly thirty years and began working for R.G. & G.R. Harris
Funeral Homes (“Harris Homes”) as a funeral director and
embalmer.99 When Ms. Stephens was hired, she presented as the
male sex she was assigned at birth.100 Approximately two years into
her employment with Harris Homes, Ms. Stephens began seeing a
therapist for treatment of despair and loneliness, and her treating
clinicians recommended Ms. Stephens to begin living her life
presenting as a female, the gender that she identified with.101
Ms. Stephens underwent four more years of professional
counseling before deciding that she could no longer put her gender
transition on hold.102 Ms. Stephens drafted a letter to her colleagues
and provided that letter to her boss, Mr. Rost, which explained how
she could no longer live with the agony and that she was going to
take a vacation to have a sex reassignment surgery and then return
to work presenting as her true identity of a woman.103 Ms. Stephens
was fired before her vacation even began because “Stephens’s

96. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1737-38.
97. Id. at 1744.
98. Brief for Respondent Aimee Stephens at 4, Bostock v. Clayton County,
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (No. 18-107). Ms. Stephens has since passed away and
unfortunately did not live to see that she won her case in the Supreme Court.
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738.
99. Brief for Respondent Aimee Stephens, supra note 98, at 5.
100. Id. at 5-6.
101. Id. at 7. Ms. Stephens was recommended to live her life consistently
with her gender identity for a year before undergoing a gender transition, which
is recommended by clinicians to alleviate the anguish that someone who suffers
from gender dysphoria experiences. Id. at 6-7.
102. Id. at 7.
103. Id. at 7-8.
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demand was not going to work out.”104
Ms. Stephens filed a complaint of discrimination with the
EEOC after being fired, which in turn filed a claim on her behalf in
the federal district court against Harris Homes alleging sex
discrimination under Title VII because her “transition from male to
female . . . did not conform to sex- or gender-based preferences . . .
or stereotypes.”105 Harris Homes was granted summary judgment
under the Religious Freedom Reformation Act (“RFRA”), and the
EEOC appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals where Ms.
Stephens intervened.106 The Sixth Circuit reversed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment, reasoning that RFRA did not
apply to Harris Homes because it failed to demonstrate a
substantial burden to its religious freedom.107 The court further
explained that with respect to an employee’s transgender status, “it
is analytically impossible to fire an employee based on that
employee’s status as a transgender person without being motivated,
at least in part, by the employee’s sex.”108 Harris Homes
subsequently petitioned for writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court.109

104. Brief for the Petitioner R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes at 10,
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (No. 18-107). Harris Homes
argued in its brief that its reason was not transgender motivated, but it was
dress code motivated. Id. Harris asserted that if Ms. Stephens showed up to
work abiding by the male dress code, Ms. Stephens would have been permitted
to keep her job. Id. This was in response to Ms. Stephens’s Hopkins style
argument that she was fired for gender stereotyping and failed to conform to
the stereotypes that Mr. Rost prescribed. Brief for Respondent Aimee Stephens,
supra note 98, at 23-4. Harris Homes argued in response that there was no sexbased discrimination because Mr. Rost would have fired a member of the female
sex for wearing the male uniform and therefore, Ms. Stephens was not being
treated any worse than someone in a comparable circumstance of the opposite
sex. Brief for the Petitioner R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes at 38-39.
105. Brief for Respondent Aimee Stephens, supra note 98, at 11-12.
106. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d at 567. The district court
agreed with Harris Homes that transgender status is not a protected class
under Title VII, but Stephens’s sex stereotype claim was adequately stated. Id.
However, on summary judgment the district court held that RFRA precluded
the EEOC from enforcing Title VII. Id. at 570.
107. Id. at 575. Harris Homes argued that RFRA applied because their
religious freedom was substantially burdened by continuing Stephens’s
employment because Stephens would cause a distraction to the grieving
customers based on her attire and that there would be considerable pressure for
Mr. Rost to leave the funeral home industry if he continued to employ Ms.
Stephens. Id. at 585, 587. The court rejected these arguments on the grounds
that they were presumed biases and speculative. Id.
108. Id. at 575.
109. Brief for Respondent Aimee Stephens, supra note 98, at 14.
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Mr. Bostock

Mr. Bostock worked for over ten years as the Child Welfare
Services Coordinator for Clayton County, Georgia.110 As a gay male,
Mr. Bostock began participating in a gay softball league in 2013.111
In the following months, as members of the community became
aware of Mr. Bostock’s involvement in the softball league, Mr.
Bostock began receiving open criticism and disparaging remarks for
his sexual orientation by individuals of the county that had
considerable influence.112 In April of 2013, an audit was conducted
on the Court Appointed Special Advocates Program of the funds
that Mr. Bostock was in charge of.113 One month later, Mr. Bostock’s
sexual orientation and participation in the gay softball league were
discussed in a disparaging way at a Friends of Clayton County
CASA Advisory Board.114 Mr. Bostock was fired in June of 2013 for
“conduct unbecoming of a county employee.”115
Mr. Bostock filed a pro se complaint in the Northern District of
Georgia, alleging a violation of Title VII’s discrimination because of
sex on the grounds that he was fired for his sexual orientation.116
The district court granted the County’s motion to dismiss, relying
on precedent that Title VII did not provide relief for discrimination
because of sexual orientation.117 The court also rejected Mr.
Bostock’s sex stereotype claim as impermissibly bootstrapping a
gender
stereotyping
allegation
to
sexual
orientation
discrimination.118 Mr. Bostock appealed to the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, but the Eleventh Circuit swiftly disposed of his
claim, affirming the district court’s decision in a brief four page
opinion.119 Mr. Bostock petitioned for writ of certiorari to the

110. Brief for Petitioner Bostock at 4, Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct.
1731 (2020) (No. 17-618).
111. Id. at 5.
112. Id.
113. Id. Clayton County maintained at the district court level that Mr.
Bostock was terminated because of the results of the audit. Id. at 6. However,
by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, that argument appeared to
have been abandoned. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1744 (stating that the
employers “do not dispute that they fired the plaintiffs for being homosexual or
transgender”).
114. Brief for Petitioner Bostock, supra note 110, at 5.
115. Id. at 5-6.
116. Bostock v. Clayton County, No. 1:16-CV-001460-ODE-WEJ, 2016 WL
9753356, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 2016).
117 Id. at *2, *7.
118. Id. at *7.
119. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Comm’r, 723 Fed. Appx. 964, 964-65
(11th Cir. 2018).
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Supreme Court.120
3.

Mr. Zarda

Mr. Zarda, a gay male, worked as a skydiving instructor for
Altitude Express.121 Mr. Zarda would accompany clients on tandem
skydives where they would be hooked together in close proximity
with one another.122 In summer 2010, Mr. Zarda was accompanying
a female client on a tandem skydive, and he referenced that he was
gay, saying “[he] had an ex-husband to prove it,” which Mr. Zarda
said he and his colleagues would sometimes do to alleviate any
discomfort a female client would have about being hooked in with
belts in close proximity with a male instructor while skydiving.123
However, the client alleged that Mr. Zarda inappropriately touched
her, and she told her boyfriend who then told Mr. Zarda’s boss.124
Mr. Zarda denied the allegations but was fired soon after.125 He
maintained that he was fired for his sexual orientation.126
Mr. Zarda filed two claims in federal district court: “(1) sex
discrimination under Title VII based on stereotyping allegations
and (2) sexual-orientation discrimination under [New York] state
law.”127 Summary judgment was granted in favor of Altitude
Express with respect to the Title VII claim, but Mr. Zarda’s state
law claim was permitted to go to trial where the jury returned a
verdict in favor of Altitude Express.128 Mr. Zarda appealed to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, who in turn affirmed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to the Title VII
claim in accordance with Second Circuit precedent that sexual

120. Brief for Petitioner Bostock, supra note 110, at 9.
121. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 108.
122. Id.
123. Id.; Opening Brief for Respondents Zarda and Moore at 3-4, Bostock v.
Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (No. 17-623).
124. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 108.
125. Id. at 108-09.
126. Id at 109. Of note, when Mr. Zarda sought unemployment benefits,
Altitude Express informed the New York Department of Labor that Mr. Zarda
was terminated, “for shar[ing] inappropriate information with [customers]
regarding his personal life.” Opening Brief for Respondents Zarda and Moore,
supra note 123, at 4.
127. Brief for Petitioners Altitude Express, Inc., and Ray Maynard, supra
note 21, at 3. New York has an anti-discrimination law that prevents
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See N.Y. Penal Law § 296(1)(a)
(McKinney 2004) (“[I]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: For an
employer . . . because of an individual’s…sexual orientation, gender identity or
expression . . . to refuse to hire or to bar or to discharged from employment such
individual[.]”).
128. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 109.
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orientation discrimination was not protected under Title VII.129 The
Second Circuit reheard the case en banc and overturned the
decision enabling Mr. Zarda to bring a Title VII claim for
discrimination based on sexual orientation.130 Relying on the
reasoning used in Hively, the Second Circuit responded specifically
to Judge Sykes’ argument that Congress would not have
contemplated protecting sexual orientation under sex. 131 The
Second Circuit explained that “[e]ven if that were so, the same could
also be said of multiple forms of discrimination that are
indisputably prohibited by Title VII, as the Supreme Court and
lower courts have determined.”132 Altitude Express petitioned for
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.133
Ms. Stephens’s, Mr. Bostock’s, and Mr. Zarda’s cases were
consolidated and heard as Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia
before the United States Supreme.134 On June 15, 2020, the Court
issued its decision, with Justice Gorsuch writing the majority
opinion on behalf of the Court.135

III. ANALYSIS
Justice Neil Gorsuch began the majority opinion in Bostock
by taking a step-by-step approach to defining the phrase
129. Id. at 109; see Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding that Title VII does not protect sexual orientation discrimination).
130. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 132.
131. Id. The majority implemented the same Comparator Test analysis in
Hively where a male who is attracted to a male is compared to a female who is
attracted to a male. Id. Because the male is punished for conduct that the female
colleague is not punished for, the court concludes that the male (Zarda) was
discriminated against in part because of his sex. Id. Altitude Express argued
that this is improper use of the Comparator Test and the proper use of the test
is comparing a male attracted to a male with a female attracted to a female and
because both, male and female alike, would be terminated there is no
discrimination. Brief for Petitioners Altitude Express, Inc., and Ray Maynard,
supra note 21, at 33-35. The majority addressed this argument as an improper
use of the test referring to Hopkins where comparing a female who is too macho
to a male who is too feminine would result in no discrimination taking place
contrary to the holding in Hopkins. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 117.
132. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 114 (citing Barnes v. Castle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C.
Cir. 1977)) (holding that plaintiff was discriminated against under Title VII
because she refused to engage in an affair with her boss, explaining that the
plaintiff was targeted by her supervisor because he was sexually attracted to
her as a woman); Burlington Indus, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998)
(explaining that despite not appearing in the language of the statute, a hostile
work environment nonetheless violates Title VII).
133. Opening Brief for Respondents Zarda and Moore, supra note 123, at 1.
134. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737-38.
135. Id. at 1737-54.
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“discrimination because of sex.”136 He explained that discrimination
because of an employee’s sexual orientation is sex discrimination
because sex plays a necessary role in that decision.137 This Part will
deconstruct and analyze Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion and the
arguments that allowed him to reach his conclusion. Justices Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Elena Kagan, Sonya Sotomayor, Steven Breyer,
and Chief Justice John Roberts agreed with Justice Gorsuch and
signed on to the opinion.138 This section will also analyze Justice
Samuel Alito’s dissenting opinion, signed also by Justice Clarence
Thomas, and his criticisms of Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning.139
Additionally, this Section will briefly explore Justice Brett
Kavanaugh’s dissent that critiqued the majority for interpreting the
literal meaning of Title VII sex discrimination rather than the plain
and ordinary meaning of sex discrimination.140
The impact of the Court’s holding has marked a shift in the
future and current state of employment law. By holding that sexual
orientation and transgender status are now protected by Title VII,
substantial protections have now been afforded to a community of
individuals who were, up until now, freely discriminated against in
the employment context with no avenue to turn for legal remedy.

A. Majority Opinion
1.

Discrimination Because of Sex Fundamentals

The Court began its analysis addressing the traditional
dictionary definition of “sex.”141 Bostock County, Harris Homes and
Altitude Express (collectively “the Employers”) argued that
Webster’s 1964 common dictionary definition of “sex” best
demonstrated the ordinary meaning of the word, which referred to
“either of the two divisions of organisms distinguished as male or
female; male or females (especially men or women) collectively.”142
Instead of resolving the dispute between the parties as to the
meaning of sex, Justice Gorsuch applied the definition of sex urged
by the Employers.143 Justice Gorsuch reasoned, however, that using
136. Id. at 1739-41.
137. Id. at 1741-42.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1754-84 (Alito, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 1822-37 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 1739.
142. Brief for Respondent Clayton County at 13, Bostock v. Clayton County,
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (No. 17-618); Sex, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY
OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1335 (college ed. 1964).
143. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (“[B]ecause nothing in our approach to these
cases turns on the outcome of the parties’ debate, and because the employees
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this particular definition was not dispositive of the issue.144 Justice
Gorsuch’s use of this definition was the same definition of sex that
the dissent applied in this case, and Justice Alito provided ample
contemporaneous traditional dictionary support for the use of that
definition as of 1964.145 However, there is an argument to be made
for a broad definition of the word “sex” to be used because some
dictionaries as early as 1955, one of which being a 1961 edition of
Webster’s Dictionary, included gender in one of their three
definitions of sex.146
After settling on a definition for sex, Justice Gorsuch proceeded
to define what Title VII meant by the phrase “because of sex.”147
Citing Supreme Court precedent, Justice Gorsuch concluded that
“because of” indicated a but-for causation standard.148 The standard
is whether the outcome would not have occurred but-for the
employer’s purpose – the question is whether the employer would
not have acted against the employee but-for the employee’s sex.149
The Court also addressed the threshold for sufficient causation
to find liability under Title VII as a result of Congress’s 1991 Sex
Amendment.150 Congress amended Title VII so that “an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that . . . sex . . . was a motivating factor . . . even
though other factors also motivated the practice.”151 This standard
concede the point for argument’s sake, we proceed on the assumption that ‘sex’
signified what the employers suggest, referring only to biological distinctions
between male and female.”).
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th
Cir. 1977) (“[T]his court concludes that Congress had only the traditional
notions of ‘sex’ in mind.”); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098,
1101 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (“It is abundantly clear that the Civil Rights Act of 1964
has for its purpose the guaranty of equal job opportunity for male and female.”).
146. Eskridge Jr., supra note 27, at 338; Sex, WEBSTER’S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2296 (2d unabridged
ed. 1961) (“[T]he sphere of behavior dominated by the relations between male
and female.”); Sex, AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY (Clarence L. Barnhart ed.,
1955) (defining “sex" with reference to the anatomical differences between male
and females, or “the phenomena depending on these differences”).
147. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738-39.
148. Id at 1739.
149. Id. Justice Gorsuch’s approach is distinct and a departure compared to
the history of landmark sex discrimination cases. Cf. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662;
Smith, 395 F. Supp. at 1101; Cooper, 274 F. Supp. at 783; Gilbert, 429 U.S. at
145-46. As mentioned above in Part II, many courts would conclude that
because of Title VII’s lack of legislative history, a narrow definition of sex must
be used. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1090. However, Justice Gorsuch took a very
detailed and meticulous approach, indicating a new direction for the analysis of
sex discrimination cases. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738-41.
150. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739.
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2022).
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is relatively easy to meet and, presumably, if sex is a factor among
a dozen, as long as sex was a motivating factor, liability under Title
VII has been met.152
However, even under the traditional but-for causation
standard, Title VII does not state that sex must be the “sole” or
“primary” factor in affecting one’s employment status, as Congress
has chosen to do with other statutes.153 “So long as the plaintiff’s
sex was one but-for cause of that decision, that is enough to trigger
the law.”154 Justice Gorsuch explained that because disposition of
the Court’s analysis is the same under the “motivating factor”
standard and the but-for standard, the Court would focus on the
“more traditional” but-for causation standard.155
Finally, defining discrimination through the use of Supreme
Court precedent,156 the Court concluded that discrimination meant
the same thing today as it did in 1964, defined as intentionally
worse treatment of a person.157
2.

Discrimination Against the Individual or the Class?

The Employers argued that discrimination incorporated the
practice of categorical discrimination.158 However, the majority
disagreed with that interpretation as it applied to Title VII.159 Title
VII provides three instances after the phrase “discriminate against”
where the statute focuses on individuals and not on categorical
classes.160 The Court found the Employers’ argument unpersuasive
152. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738-40.
153. See id. at 1739-40 (concluding Congress intended to allow a plaintiff to
prevail by showing that sex was nothing more than a motivating factor).
154. Id. at 1739.
155. Id. at 1740.
156. See Burlington N. & S.F.R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 59 (2006)
(explaining that discrimination is to treat others worse who are similarly
situated).
157.
Discrimination,
CAMBRIDGE
DICTIONARY,
www.dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/discrimination
[perma.cc/NCQ4-DB78] (last visited Feb. 14, 2022).
158. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1740-41. The Employers essentially argued that
because gay men are treated in the same manner as lesbian women, or
transgender women are treated in the same manner as transgender men, there
is no discrimination as a class because males in one category are being treated
equally to females in the other category. Brief for Petitioners Altitude Express,
Inc., and Ray Maynard, supra note 21, at 12-3. Thus, both sexes are being
treated equally. Id.
159. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1740-41.
160. See 28 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2022) (stating employers may not “fail or
refuse to hire or . . . discharge any individual, or otherwise . . . discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex”) (emphasis
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and accordingly dismissed it, reasoning that the legislature could
have written the statute differently by specifically providing for
discrimination against one class compared to another class with
respect to sex, but chose not to.161 Interestingly, the Employers’
interpretation could have potentially left a significant loophole in
the statute.162 For example, an employer could argue, that even
though a female was fired because of her sex, the employer fired a
male because of his sex, so therefore, there would not be a violation
of the statute because females as a class would not have been
treated any worse than males as a class.163 The Court concluded
that because the statute pertains to individuals, the employer in the
above scenario would be liable for multiple causes of action under
Title VII, and would not avoid liability by compounding his
discriminatory conduct.164 Thus, if an employer discriminated
against a male employee because of sex, and subsequently
discriminated against a female employee because of sex, then there
would be two causes of action under Title VII. It would be to no avail
to the employer to argue that since both sexes have been treated
equally with discriminatory treatment, neither individual has a
claim against the employer because there has been equal treatment
between the sexes overall; even if it was equally discriminatory.165
3.

Sex is Inextricably Intertwined with Sexual Orientation

Justice Gorsuch remarked that “it is impossible to
discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender
without discriminating against that individual based on sex.”166 The
Court relied on the Comparator Test, which the Seventh Circuit
used in Hively and the Second Circuit used in Zarda, for the heart
of its argument.167 For example, if Mr. Bostock was fired for no
reason other than being attracted to the male sex, then the
employer has discriminated against Mr. Bostock for conduct that
added).
161. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1740-41.
162. Id.
163. Id. Altitude Express argued in its brief that to discriminate is to treat
one sex better than the other. Brief for Petitioners Altitude Express, Inc., and
Ray Maynard, supra note 21, at 13. The reasoning of the argument was that
since gay males are fired and lesbian females will also be fired, there is no
disparate treatment endured by one sex and therefore, no discrimination under
the scope of Title VII. Id. at 14.
164. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1740-41. This would compound the employer’s
liability under Title VII because in both instances, the individual was
discharged because of sex and that is the determining factor.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1741.
167. Id.; Hively, 853 at 345; Zarda, 883 at 116.
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the employer tolerates in female employees.168 The employer has
intentionally penalized Mr. Bostock for being attracted to the male
sex, but does not punish a female employee for being attracted to
the male sex.169 Therefore, at least in part, Mr. Bostock has been
fired on account of sex because Mr. Bostock was fired for being
attracted to the male sex while being of the male sex.170
The Employers addressed this reasoning by contending that
comparing a homosexual male to a heterosexual female does not
produce a similarly situated opposite-sex comparison because two
variables change – sex and sexual orientation.171 By changing sex
and sexual orientation, the Comparator Test fails to identify sex
discrimination when more than one variable is changed.172 The
proper comparator would be a homosexual male to a homosexual
female.173 Such argument was unpersuasive to the Court because,
168. Brief for Petitioner Bostock, supra note 110, at 15.
169. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1741-42. It is important to note when considering
the counter-arguments that will be discussed in response to the Comparator
Test that Title VII does not require primary or sole causation as previously
discussed. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2022). It is only required that sex was a
motivating factor. Id. In his dissent, Justice Alito specifically responded by
positing how one could discriminate against sexual orientation without knowing
the sex of the individual and therefore sex is not necessarily connected to sexual
orientation. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1758-59 (Alito, J., dissenting).
170. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741-42 (emphasis added). The Court explained
that the dissent’s attempt to isolate sexual orientation from sex was futile and
did nothing to insulate the employer from liability. Id. The Court gave the
example of an arsonist who burns down a house to improve the view – these
actions are still arson despite having multiple intentions. Id. at 1742. In this
dynamic, an employer cannot escape liability for firing someone because of their
sexual orientation because that employer is punishing that employee for
conduct that an employee of the opposite sex is not punished for. Id. Sex is
inescapably incorporated to sexual orientation. Id.
171. Brief for Petitioners Altitude Express, Inc., and Ray Maynard, supra
note 21, at 35.
172. Id. There are a couple of strong counter-arguments to the Employers’
contention that when multiple variables change, application of the Comparator
Test is flawed. There is Supreme Court precedent to indicate that multiple
variables changing is not fatal to the Comparator Test argument, which will be
demonstrated more thoroughly in Part IV. See, e.g., Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 235
(holding it was sex discrimination to refuse Plaintiff a promotion for not wearing
enough jewelry and make-up); Manhart, 435 U.S. at 704-05 (holding that it was
sex discrimination when a factor of sex was discriminated against). One could
argue that even if multiple variables change, that does not foreclose the
comparator argument because that is evidence that the variable that also
changes is dependent on sex, and necessarily related. Firing a female employee
because she is married to another female, is discriminating against that female
employee for being a female attracted to a female. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345-46.
Irrespective of the comparator argument, this is intentionally worse treatment
based on sex and is discrimination under Title VII. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1740.
173. Brief for Petitioners Altitude Express, Inc., and Ray Maynard, supra
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irrespective, sex-based rules are still necessarily being implicated.
174

4.

Response to the Employers’ Arguments

The Employers did not dispute that they fired the plaintiffs
for being homosexual or transgender but asserted several
arguments to defend their actions.175 The Employers argued that
sexual orientation or transgender discrimination are not referred to
as sex discrimination in ordinary conversation.176 The Court
rejected this argument because it ignored Title VII’s lack of a sole
causation requirement.177 If one is fired for getting married or
denied benefits for disabilities arising from pregnancy by an
employer’s disability plan, as in Sprogis and Gilbert, sex may still
be a factor, and that is sufficient.178 It does not matter how one
refers to their own termination because one is likely not going to
recite every factor that led to their termination in ordinary
conversation.179 More importantly, it is irrelevant how the employee
describes their own termination because the intent of the employer
is dispositive under the causation standard.180
The Employers next argued that an employer who
discriminated based on homosexuality or transgender status does
not intentionally discriminate based on sex, which a disparate
treatment claim requires.181 However, the Court rejected this
note 21, at 35; see Hively, 853 F.3d at 366 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (asserting if an
employer “is willing to hire gay men but not lesbians, then the comparative
method has exposed an actual case of sex discrimination”).
174. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1745.
175. Id. at 1744.
176. Id. at 1745.
177. Id.
178. Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1204 (Stevens, C.J., dissenting); Gilbert, 429 U.S.
at 136.
179. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1745. The Court’s reasoning lies on the premise
that if one is refused employment for being a mother, she might not tell her
friends that she was refused employment based on sex, yet the Court recognized
this as sex discrimination nonetheless. Id.; see also Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam) (holding that it is sex discrimination to
refuse employment to women with young children while employing men with
young children).
180. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738.
181. Brief for Respondent Clayton County, supra note 143, at 33; Bostock,
140 S. Ct. at 1744-45. This was an argument made by the dissent in Mr. Zarda’s
case in the Second Circuit. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 156 (Lynch, J., dissenting). Judge
Lynch explained that an employer who refuses to hire a lesbian applicant has
only considered sex in the limited sense of noticing that that person is a female,
but that is not a component of the employer’s intent to discriminate. Id. The
discriminatory intent is a component of the applicant’s sexual orientation. Id.
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argument by reiterating that discriminating on account of sexual
orientation or transgender status “necessarily and intentionally
applies sex-based rules.”182 An employer necessarily punishes
employees because of their sex when the employer implements a
policy of refusing to hire gay and transgender people,
notwithstanding the motive to only punish employees motivated by
sexual orientation and transgender status.183 The essence of this
argument is that even if the employer’s intentional motivation is to
discriminate on sexual orientation, the employer cannot help but
factor the sex of the employee because the employee is being
punished for being a member of the same sex as their partner.184
The Employers argued that sexual orientation and
transgender status could not be incorporated into sex
discrimination because one can discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation without ever learning the sex of the job applicant.185 In
response, the Court employed a hypothetical where an employer
refuses to hire anyone who checks a box on their application that
they are Black or Catholic, and explained that an employer who
refuses to hire anyone on such grounds has violated Title VII.186 The
Court found that this same analogy applied with respect to sexual
orientation discrimination.187 This is because even if an employer
does not know the sex of the applicant, the employer is still using
sex as a basis to exercise discriminatory treatment against an
individual.188
The Employers additionally argued that sexual orientation
and transgender status were not protected classes under Title VII
and if Congress wanted to protect them they would have been
included.189 The Court conceded that sexual orientation and
transgender status were distinct concepts from sex.190 However,
because sex is necessarily intertwined with sexual orientation and
transgender status, sexual orientation or transgender status
discrimination cannot occur without the presence of sex

182. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1745.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1746. Justice Gorsuch explained that by purposely creating a rule
that hinges on the race or religion of the applicant, there is a violation of Title
VII, irrespective of whether the employer is aware of the race or religion of the
applicants or not. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Brief for Respondent Clayton County, supra note 143, at 13; Brief for
the Petitioner R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, supra note 104, at 21-22.
190. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1745.
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discrimination.191 Moreover, the Court rejected the premise that
Congress’s failure to provide for a specific case within a broad
provision created the implication that it was meant to be
excluded.192 The Employers further argued that Congress
considered proposals to add sexual orientation to Title VII and
declined to do so.193 This argument was not persuasive to the Court
because it speculated as to why Congress did not amend Title VII.194
There are a multitude of reasons why a bill does not survive
Congress, perhaps the legislature believed that sexual orientation
was already protected by sex and did not believe a later revision was
needed.195
Trying another angle, the Employers argued that few, if any,
would understand the ordinary meaning of sex under Title VII to
protect gay and transgender people in 1964 when the statute was
enacted, and therefore, the legislators did not intend to protect gay
and transgender people.196 Legislative intent should be consulted to
clear any ambiguity, the Court reasoned, and that was not the case
here.197 When the statute’s terms are clear, the Court does not need
to review the legislature’s intent.198 The people have a right to rely
on the written law and should not have to be concerned that the
Court might ignore the plain terms for factors beyond the text.199
The Court found there was no merit in the argument that because
few in 1964 expected such a result, that the Court should refuse to
accord the proper meaning to the statutory text.200
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Brief for Respondent Clayton County, supra note 143, at 9 (“Congress
repeatedly has rejected dozens of amendments to Title VII to add sexual
orientation as a protected class.”).
194. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1746-47.
195. Id. Understandably, the Court recognized the danger of interpreting an
existing law based on the conduct of later legislatures that was enacted by an
earlier Congress as mere speculation. Id. Moreover, the Court followed earlier
precedent in not giving much credence to subsequent legislative history. Id. at
1747 (citing Sullivan v. Finklestein, 496 U.S. 617, 632 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)) (explaining “[a]rguments based on subsequent legislative history .
. . should not be taken seriously, not even in a footnote”).
196. Brief for the Petitioner R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, supra note
104, at 19-20.
197. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1749.
198. Id.
199. Id. The fact that a statute may reach beyond the intentions of the
legislature is immaterial and does not demonstrate ambiguity of the statute, it
instead demonstrates the scope of the legislation. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985).
200. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1749. The Court further rejected the Employer’s
argument that few would have foreseen this result because shortly after Title
VII was enacted, sexual orientation claims and transgender claims were filed,
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The Employers’ final argument was based on the policy that
if the Court were to allow protection to gay and transgender people,
a number of undesirable policy consequences would follow.201 More
specifically, the Employers argued that complying with Title VII
going forward would require them to renounce their religious beliefs
and surrender religious liberties safeguarded by the
Constitution.202 Additionally, the Employers argued that were the
Court to rule for the plaintiffs, then males who identify as female
could play in the Women’s National Basketball Association.203 This
could also “prohibit organizations from maintaining sex-specific
sleep facilities, showers, restrooms, and locker rooms,” which would
compromise the privacy of individuals.204 In response, holding that
Title VII protects transgender and gay people from employment
discrimination, the Court explained that nothing more was being
decided.205 Moreover, doctrines protecting religious freedom, such
as the Religious Freedom Reformation Act or the First Amendment,
which interact with the Court’s holding, were not being decided
either.206 The Court stated that the Employers’ concerns could be
addressed at another time.207

which implied that at least some people saw this as a potential avenue for
redress. Id.; Smith, 395 F. Supp. at 1099; Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661.
201. Brief for the Petitioner R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, supra note
104, at 45.
202. Id. at 48. Harris Homes drew support from Amicus Curiae that argued
that requiring an employee, such as a schoolteacher, to refer to a transgender
student with their current gender identity rather than their assigned sex at
birth could be viewed as compelled speech or compelling certain beliefs contrary
to one’s religion. Brief for Amicus Curiae Center for Arizona Policy in Support
of the Petitioner at 6, Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (No.
18-107). Harris Homes drew further support from the fact that schoolteachers
and professors have been terminated for refusing to call students by their
desired gender pronouns. Brief for the Petitioner R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes, supra note 104, at 49; Teacher Fired For Refusing To Use Transgender
Student’s Pronouns, NBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2018), www.nbcnews.to/2QFvQEL
[perma.cc/6JHH-HQJD]. Harris Homes argued that if the Court were to rule in
favor of plaintiffs, then those instances would occur more frequently. Brief for
the Petitioner R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, supra note 104, at 49.
203. Brief for the Petitioner R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, supra note
104, at 48.
204. Id. at 45.
205. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754.
206. Id.
207. Id.

385

UIC Law Review

[55:357

B. Justice Alito Dissents
1.

The Definition of Sex Did Not Incorporate Sexual
Orientation in 1964

Justice Alito penned a vigorous dissent that accused the
majority of modifying the legislation.208 He began his dissent by
stating that the definition of sex commonly used before and
throughout the sixties did not include sexual orientation or
transgender status.209 Justice Alito reasoned that since traditional
definitions of sex at the time Title VII was passed did not include
sexual orientation or gender, the ordinary meaning of the statute
could not include them.210 Further, he stated sexual orientation,
gender, and sex are all distinct concepts from one another thereby
challenging the majority’s concept that sex and sexual orientation
are necessarily intertwined.211
However, this is not entirely correct,212 and even some of the
dictionary definitions of sex that Justice Alito cited in the appendix
could arguably include notions of gender, which could certainly then
protect sexual orientation and transgender status.213 For instance,
in 1953, Webster’s Dictionary defined sex as “the character of being
male or female” in one of its many definitions of sex.214 One could
208. Id. at 1754 (Alito, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 1756; see Brief for Respondent Clayton County, supra note 143,
at 14 (“[T]he meaning of the term “sex” remains unchanged today”). The ironic
thing is Clayton County cited definitions of “sex” that implicate gender. Id. at
13-14. It almost seems as if there is a fundamental misunderstanding in our
society of what gender means and its relation to sex fueling the litigation of
these issues of “sex” discrimination, rather than whether sexual orientation
discrimination is sex discrimination.
210. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1756 (Alito, J., dissenting).
211. Id.
212. See Sex, supra note 147 (explaining that various common dictionaries
at the time included concepts of gender in their definitions of sex).
213. Id. One of the definitions of gender in the year 2020 is defined as “the
behavioral, cultural, or psychological traits typically associated with one sex.”
Gender,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/gender [perma.cc/L4HQ-9RNU] (last visited Feb. 14,
2022). This shares similar qualities to definitions of sex used before and during
the sixties. Accord Sex, RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1307 (1966) (“[T]he sum of the structural and functional differences
by which male and female are distinguished, or the phenomena or behavior
dependent on these difference.”); Sex, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1187
(1969) (“[T]he condition or character of being male or female; the physiological,
functional, and psychological differences that distinguish the male and the
female.”).
214. Sex, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2296 (2d ed. 1953)
(defining “Sex” as “the sphere of behavior dominated by the relations between
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certainly argue that Ms. Stephens experienced sex discrimination
when she was terminated for portraying the female character, while
her boss was adamant that Ms. Stephens was still a male because
that was the sex Ms. Stephens was assigned at birth.
Justice Alito posited that because sex, sexual orientation and
transgender status are different concepts, one could certainly be
terminated for sexual orientation and transgender status without
even considering sex.215 He offered an example where an employer
posts a sign stating “[w]e do not hire gays, lesbians, or transgender
individuals” and an employer can exercise this policy without ever
discriminating on the basis of sex because the employer does not
know the sex of the employee he is discriminating against.216
Further, Justice Alito continued to rebuke the majority’s
interpretation that sexual orientation was a necessary component
of sex by reasoning that many things are related to sex, but Title
VII only prohibits discrimination based on sex itself, not every
component of sex.217
2.

Advancing the Flawed Comparator Argument

“The problem with this argument is that the Court loads the
dice.”218 Justice Alito reasoned that the Court rigged the variables
in its hypothetical of the Comparator Test to assume the conclusion
that sex and sexual orientation are necessarily intertwined.219 He
endorsed the Employer’s argument, as well as Judge Sykes’s, that
because sexual orientation and sex have changed, there are
effectively two variables.220 The only inferences that could be made,
he explained, are that the employer was motivated entirely by sex
and/or sexual orientation.221 Justice Alito believed that because the
employer could have been motivated entirely by sexual orientation,
the Court’s example failed to show that sex was necessarily a
motivating factor in an employer’s decision.222
make and female”).
215. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1757 (Alito, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 1758-59.
217. Id. at 1760.
218. Id. at 1762.
219. Id.
220. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 366 (explaining that when two variables are
changed, it fails to isolate the actual cause of the employer’s actions) (Sykes, J.,
dissenting); Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1762; Brief for Respondent Clayton County,
supra note 143, at 27.
221. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1762.
222. Id. Justice Alito recognizes that there is merely a difference in
characterization. Id. If the objectionable conduct is the state of being attracted
to men, that could provide support to the plaintiffs. Id. But if it is characterized
as homosexuality, then that is support for defendants. Id. At best, this is only
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Justice Alito continued to assert his point by proposing a
Comparator Test with four categories: (1) man attracted to men; (2)
woman attracted to men; (3) woman attracted to women; and (4)
man attracted to women.223 Because the two categories that would
be fired due to an employer’s anti-homosexual policy would be
(category 1) the man attracted to men, and (category 3) the woman
attracted to women, he concluded that sex did not play a role in the
decision.224 In other words, an employer is not singling out one’s sex
with disparate treatment because both, male and female alike, face
discriminatory treatment, which compels the conclusion that the
sole motivation is sexual orientation.225 The essence of Justice
Alito’s proposed hypothetical was to demonstrate that the decision
to fire a gay or transgender employee is made irrespective of sex
because an employer would be inclined to fire a male or female,
provided that individual is gay or transgender.226
3.

Prominent Arguments from the Lower Courts

Plaintiffs made the argument that sexual orientation or
transgender discrimination was a form of impermissible sex
stereotyping, which was held to be a form of sex discrimination in
Hopkins.227 Although Justice Gorsuch never addressed this
argument in the Court’s majority opinion, Justice Alito flatly
rejected the argument and reasoned that Title VII did not prohibit
discrimination based on sex stereotypes.228 Specifically, Justice
Alito explained that sex stereotyping can be a form of sex
discrimination when an employee, like Ms. Hopkins in Hopkins, is
discriminated against for characterizations like being too macho, or

evidence of ambiguity in the text. Id.
223. Id. at 1763.
224. Id.
225. Brief for Respondent Clayton County, supra note 143, at 33. The
purpose of Justice Alito’s four-category test is to show that, at the very least,
the statutory text is not unambiguous like the Court said in its opinion. Bostock,
140 S. Ct. at 1763. He is also positing that sex is a distinct concept from sexual
orientation where an employer could discriminate against sexual orientation in
some situations and never consider the sex of an individual. Id. The majority
concludes however, that when sexual orientation is the cause of being fired, that
individual is being punished for being attracted to a member of the sex that
their colleague of the opposite sex is not punished for. Id. The majority fully
concedes that sex and sexual orientation are distinct concepts. Id. at 1745.
Nonetheless, when a decision is made based on sexual orientation, that
individual is being punished because of their sex. Id.
226. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1763.
227. Brief for Respondent Aimee Stephens, supra note 98, at 32; Hopkins,
490 U.S. at 251.
228. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1764.
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not wearing enough jewelry.229 But he opined that sex stereotyping
alone was not sex discrimination.230 Justice Alito explained that
this was an important distinction because sexual orientation and
transgender status are forms of sex stereotyping, but they are not
exclusive to the male or female sex.231 And because they do not
apply to one sex exclusively—such as being too macho, or not
wearing enough jewelry, or not walking feminine enough—it is sex
stereotyping, but he concludes it is not stereotyping that takes the
form of sex discrimination under Title VII.232
Plaintiffs
further
argued
that
sexual
orientation
discrimination was sex discrimination because it is a form of
associational discrimination – namely punishing an employee for
the sex of their partner.233 Drawing the analogy where it would be
race discrimination for an employer to fire a Black male employee
for being in a relationship with a white female, it would similarly
be sex discrimination to fire a male employee for being in a
relationship with a male.234 Justice Alito rejected this argument as
well and explained that the answer was historically rooted.235 He
explained that when an employer discriminates on the basis of
racial association, history indicates that this is inherently race
discrimination.236 Moreover, Justice Alito reasoned that Title VII
229. Id; Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 251.
230. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1764.
231. Id.
232. Id. In other words, Justice Alito was explaining that in order to have a
cognizable sex stereotyping claim under Title VII, the stereotyping conduct
must be unique to one’s sex. Id. Not wearing enough make-up would generally
be considered a negative stereotype against women or being too macho.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 235-36. Whereas being too macho would be considered, in
certain circumstances, a good thing for men. Id. at 248. Because these are
attributable primarily to one particular sex, they can be used for cognizable
claims under Title VII. Id. at 250. However, Justice Alito explained that because
heterosexuality and homosexuality are not exclusive to either sex,
discrimination on account of sexual orientation or transgender status alone does
not create a cognizable cause of action under Title VII. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at
1764. One would have a recognized claim under Title VII, say for example, a
male who is gay was fired for walking too femininely or perhaps was wearing
jewelry. Id.
233. Brief for Petitioner Bostock, supra note 110, at 18.
234. Id. Courts have recognized since 1964 that discriminating against a
person because of the racial association is an unconstitutional form of race
discrimination. See e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192-95 (1964)
(holding invalid a criminal statute that would prosecute individuals for
unmarried interracial cohabitation). The Second Circuit in Zarda held “the
prohibition on associational discrimination applies with equal force to all the
classes protected by Title VII, including sex.” Zarda, 883 F.3d at 124.
235. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1765.
236. Id.; see Hively, 853 F.3d at 368 (explaining how miscegenation laws “are
premised on invidious ideas about racial classifications toward the end of racial
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has the bonafide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) exception that
includes religion, sex, or national origin when it is necessary “to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise,” yet race
is absent.237 Sexual orientation is distinct from racial
discrimination because “sexual orientation is not historically tied to
a project that aims to subjugate either men or women.”238 Justice
Alito concluded that because race was not included as part of the
BFOQ, it warranted different consideration than sex.239
Justice Alito next addressed whether reasonable people in
1964 would have thought that Title VII’s language prohibited
sexual orientation discrimination.240 Assuring they would not,
Justice Alito asserted that Title VII sex discrimination was
understood by reasonable people to mean equal treatment for men
and women.241 Citing to multiple state and federal statutes that
prohibit some form of discrimination or unequal treatment on
account of sex, the purpose of these statutes were to campaign for
equality initiated by women’s rights movement organizations.242 In
purity and white supremacy. Sexual-orientation discrimination on the other
hand, is not inherently sexist.”) (Sykes, J., dissenting); Zarda, 883 F.3d at 159
(explaining that anti-miscegenation policies were based on racial animus to
make Black people inferior, while discriminating against an employee for the
sex of their partner is not predicated on sex-based animosity which is a
protected class, but sexual orientation animosity, which is not protected)
(Lynch, J., dissenting).
237. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1765 n.18; 28 U.S.C § 2000e-2(e) (2022).
238. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1765. The counter-argument is that there is no
demonstration of animus required for liability under Title VII. See Ricci v.
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579-80 (explaining that disparate treatment cannot
be justified by benevolent intentions). Additionally, Title VII was intended to
strike at the heart and eradicate racism. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662. Adding sex
to Title VII arguably demonstrates that Title VII was to strike with equal force
at eradicating sexism. Id. Surely, if an anti-miscegenation policy is determined
to be racist, then it logically follows that firing an employee because of the sex
of their employee’s romantic companion is sex discrimination given Title VII’s
intention to destroy barriers to “merit-based equal employment opportunity to
racism and sex alike.” Eskridge Jr., supra note 27, at 347-50.
239. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1765. Justice Alito unfortunately does not
elaborate on this point much. But he is potentially reading beyond the text of
Title VII. Id. There is no mention within Title VII that advises Courts to analyze
the protected classes differently based on historical accounts. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2 (2022); see also id. at § 2000e-3. The BFOQ provides the only instance
where one can analyze race differently than the other protected classes such as
sex; Cf. Hively, 853 F.3d at 348-49 (explaining that discrimination based on the
race of one’s associate is discrimination and that such scenario is analogous to
discrimination based on the sex of one’s romantic companion).
240. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1767.
241. Id at 1767-68.
242. Id. at 1768 (citing CA. CONST. art. XX, § 18; MONT. CONST. art. XI, § 9
(1889); WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (1890); WA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1889); UTAH
CONT. art. IV, § 1 (1889); 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (1952).

2022]

The Plain Meaning of Sex

390

particular, Justice Alito cited the 19th Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which denies the “abridgment of the right to
vote on account of sex.”243 His argument was essentially that
because language such as “because of sex,” “on account of sex,” or
“on the basis of sex” in federal and state laws is primarily used to
facilitate equality between males and females, one could infer that
this was also Congress’s intention by adding Sex to Title VII.244
Moreover, Justice Alito highlighted how gay and transgender
people were considered to suffer from psychological disorders and
mental illness because of their sexual orientation and gender
identities at the time Title VII was enacted.245 Because of such
characterizations and because homosexuality was a felony in
virtually every state at the time, Justice Alito explained that it was
self-evident that Congress would not ban the discrimination of
conduct that was deemed to be criminal.246 Additionally, Justice
Alito argued that the term transgender was not defined until the
early 1970’s and it is unlikely that Congress would protect a class
that was not widely known to the community in 1964.247

C. Justice Kavanaugh Dissents
Justice Kavanaugh primarily criticized the Court for
disregarding Title VII’s ordinary meaning in exchange for its literal
meaning.248 Justice Kavanaugh conceded that in a literal sense,
when a male is fired for being attracted to a male, sex is a
motivating factor.249 Nonetheless, Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
that the Court interpreted the literal meaning of a statute as a
practice of sexual orientation discrimination within the ordinary
meaning of “discrimination because of sex.”250
1. The Argument that Courts Must Give Light to the
Ordinary Meaning of the Text
Justice Kavanaugh opined that the Court’s job was to interpret
the statute’s language in accordance with its ordinary meaning at
the time it was enacted.251 The reasons judges give light to the
243. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIX).
244. Id. at 1768-69.
245. Id. at 1769; see Eskridge Jr., supra note 27, at 335 (explaining that
homosexuality was considered an affliction).
246. Id. at 1769-70.
247. Id. at 1773.
248. Id. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.; Perrin v United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (“A fundamental
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ordinary meaning is for rule of law and democratic
accountability.252 The rule of law must be understandable to the
citizens of the society to promote compliance and adherence because
the ordinary meaning creates democratic accountability for elected
legislatures.253
Further, Justice Kavanaugh argued that the Court erred by
deconstructing the phrase “discrimination because of sex” and
mechanically putting it back together; the phrase as a whole must
be interpreted in light of its ordinary meaning at the time the
legislation was enacted.254 It is contrary to the principles of
textualism to adhere to the literal meaning of each word in the
phrase.255 This style of literal interpretation “loses sight of the
forest for the trees,” as Judge Learned Hand put it.256 Because the
Court implemented a literal interpretation of “discrimination
because of sex,” Justice Kavanaugh argued that the Court had
stripped citizens of fair notice of what the law means to an ordinary
person.257
2. Arguing that the Ordinary Meaning of “Discrimination
because of Sex” Does Not Include Sexual Orientation or
Transgender Status
Offering a four-category test similar to Justice Alito, Justice
Kavanaugh flatly rejected the Court’s conclusion that sex and
sexual orientation were necessarily intertwined.258 He posited
“[s]uppose the four employees are a straight man, a straight woman,
a gay man, and a lesbian.”259 Justice Kavanaugh explained an

canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be
interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”); Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003) (“[T]he starting point for our
analysis is the statutory text.”); Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L.
REV. 347, 376 (2005) (“[N]o mainstream judge is interested solely in the literal
definitions of a statute’s words[.]”).
252. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1825.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: AN
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 356 (2012).
256. WILLIAM ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO
READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 62 (Foundation Press 2016) (“[W]hen
two words combine to produce a meaning that is not the mechanical composition
of the two words separately.”).
257. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1828; see, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 255,
at 17 (“[L]inchpin of statutory interpretation is ordinary meaning . . . that is
going to be most accessible to the citizenry.”).
258. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1828.
259. Id.
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employer with animosity against gay people will fire the gay man
and lesbian.260 However, an employer who has animosity against
women would fire the straight woman and lesbian because they are
women.261 Justice Kavanaugh explained that these were two
distinct harms separated by immutable characteristics that defied
the ordinary meaning of the statute.262
Moreover, Justice Kavanaugh stated that considering
discrimination because of sex to include sexual orientation ignored
the distinction made in federal law.263 He explained that because
federal statutes will add sex and sexual orientation into statutes, it
is reasonably understood that sex and sexual orientation are
distinct concepts.264 Citing numerous federal and state statutes that
provide for sex and sexual orientation discrimination,265 Justice
Kavanaugh reasoned that legislatures are more than capable to
include sexual orientation by specific reference when they intend
to.266 When they do not provide for sexual orientation, it can be
reasonably understood that sexual orientation was not intended to
be provided for in the legislation.267 Justice Kavanaugh concluded
that to interpret sexual orientation discrimination as to be
incorporated under sex discrimination would be impermissibly
updating the intent of the legislatures and casting aside the
legislator’s careful wording when enacting laws.268

IV.

PERSONAL ANALYSIS

Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and

260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.; Hively, 853 F.3d at 363 (“[T]he words plainly describe different
traits, and the separate and distinct meaning of each term is easily grasped.
More specifically to the point here, discrimination “because of sex” is not
reasonably understood to include . . . sexual orientation, a different immutable
characteristic.”) (Sykes, J., dissenting).
263. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1829 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Justice
Kavanaugh further pointed out that the phrase “discrimination because of sex”
was a term used for the women’s rights movement and that the ordinary
meaning of the phrase pertains in scope to the women’s rights movement. Id.
Since the gay rights movement came later, it could not reasonably be
understood to apply to the ordinary meaning of sex discrimination. Id.
264. Id.
265. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(A) (2022) (criminalizing violence because of
gender and sexual orientation); 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(F(ii) (2022); 34 U.S.C. §
12291(b)(13)(A) (2022) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex and sexual
orientation).
266. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1829.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1833.
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transgender status is inherently, and now correctly, considered to
be discrimination because of sex under Title VII. In Bostock v.
Clayton County, the Supreme Court properly determined that when
an employee is subject to discrimination because of their sexual
orientation or transgender status, the employer necessarily
considers the sex of the employee in violation of Title VII.269 This
Section will discuss why the Court’s determination in Bostock is
correct and why the dissenters’ opinion is unpersuasive. Moreover,
this Section will discuss the judiciary’s asymmetric approach to
analyzing sex discrimination relative to race and religious
discrimination. Specifically, it will address how the judiciary has
interpreted race and religious discrimination broadly but has
demonstrated a pattern of interpreting sex discrimination more
narrowly.

A. Sex is Inescapably Intertwined with Sexual
Orientation and Transgender Status
The Court’s use of the Comparator Test decisively shows that
sex is necessarily a factor when making employment decisions
because of sexual orientation.270 If a male employee is terminated
because he is gay at the same time that female employees attracted
to other males are not terminated, the male employee is punished
solely because he is male. The male employee is being treated
differently solely based on his sex, not to mention his failure to
conform to sex stereotypes.
The dissenters’ criticisms to the majority’s use of the
Comparator Test are unpersuasive. Justice Alito stated that sex
and sexual orientation are distinct concepts that are unrelated and
therefore, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is not
discrimination based on sex.271 Justice Alito advocated that sex and
sexual orientation are distinct concepts because an employer can
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation without ever
knowing the sex of the individual.272 However, this fails to
acknowledge the many instances where one could be in violation of
Title VII without knowing the sex, race, or religion of an individual.
Imagine an employment application that asked the following
269. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
270. Id. at 1741-42. The comparator analysis with respect to a transgender
person works analogously to that of sexual orientation. Id. For example, firing
a female who was assigned male at birth is punishing this employee for traits
that are tolerated in an otherwise identical employee, though, who was assigned
female at birth. Id.
271. Id. at 1756 (Alito, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 1757.
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questions: “Are you Caucasian? Are you Catholic?” If a prospective
employee answered “No” to either of those questions and was
refused employment because of any of those answers, a Title VII
violation would occur. The employer does not know the race of the
individual who may very well be Black, Latino or Asian; the
employer does not know if the individual is Protestant, Buddhist or
Muslim. Nonetheless, the individual applicant has been
discriminated based on race or religion. It is not necessary for the
employer to know the race, religion, or sex of the individual for there
to be a Title VII violation, nor does Title VII require that
knowledge.273 It is solely the fact that the individual received
disparate treatment because of their race, color, religion, national
origin, or sex that creates a Title VII violation.274
Further, the dissenters posited that the Comparator Test
was used incorrectly because if one changes the sex of the individual
in the comparator analysis, that also changes the sexual orientation
of the individual and thereby impermissibly changes two
variables.275 This conclusion, however, fails to acknowledge that the
Supreme Court has traditionally protected functions of sex.276 To
understand this, consider Manhart.277 Comparing a female (who is
required to pay fifteen percent more into the company pension plan
because she is likely to live longer than a male) to a male, two
variables have been changed as well in the comparator. Sex and life
expectancy have both changed because when one changes sex, life
expectancy necessarily changes as well and the Supreme Court still
held that this was sex discrimination.278 It would have been
preposterous to call this life-expectancy discrimination.
Also, consider the issue in Hopkins where two variables were

273. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a) (2022). Justice Gorsuch employed a similar
hypothetical in the majority opinion. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1746. Justice
Gorsuch used a hypothetical to show that it is not necessary to know the sex of
the individual for a violation by showing that you would not need to know the
race or religion of the individual for there to be a violation as well. Id. However,
it appears he made a mistake because he explains there would be a violation if
an employer asserts on his application that he is Catholic and is refused
employment because of that. Id. If this were the case, then the employer would
know the religion of the individual and contradict Justice Gorsuch’s conclusion.
Id. at 1759.
274. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a) (2022).
275. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1762 (Alito, J., dissenting); see Hively, 853 F.3d
at 366 (asserting that a lesbian female should be compared to a gay male)
(Sykes, J., dissenting); Zarda, 883 F.3d at 157.
276. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 704-05; Phillips, 400 U.S. 542; Hopkins, 490 U.S.
at 235; Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 462 U.S. at 676.
277. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 704-05.
278. See id. at 711 (explaining that life expectancy was a function of sex and
holding that the company pension plan was discriminatory).
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changed as well.279 Ms. Hopkins was denied a promotion for being
described as too macho, and not wearing enough jewelry and makeup.280 When the Court changed the variable of sex, the stereotypes
associated with Ms. Hopkins also changed.281 Just as in Manhart,
two variables changed.282 It would not have made any sense to
compare Ms. Hopkins, who was considered too masculine, to a male
employee who would be considered too feminine. The proper
comparison would be to compare Ms. Hopkins to a male employee
who acts macho. Because Ms. Hopkins was refused a promotion for
acting macho or aggressive, it was discrimination because the
company tolerated, in fact encouraged, that behavior in male
employees.283

B. Associational Discrimination Applies Equally to Sex
and Race Discrimination
Interestingly enough, Justice Gorsuch did not comment on
the associational discrimination argument in his opinion, but
Justice Alito nonetheless mentioned it and rejected it.284 Justice
Alito argued that discriminating against an employee based on the
sex of their partner is not the same as discriminating against the
race of one’s partner because history indicates that this is
inherently race discrimination.285 Further, Justice Alito cited the
BFOQ for support, which permits for distinctions based on sex,
religion, or national origin when reasonably necessary for normal
business operation, and he noted that race is entirely absent from
this list.286 In other words, because discriminating against an
individual based on the race of their partner is inherently racist,
and because Title VII’s BFOQ provides that it is permissible to
make sex-based distinctions when it is necessary for business
operations, then the associational discrimination argument can
only apply to race discrimination, but not sex discrimination.287
279. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 235 (holding it was discrimination because of
sex to refuse promotion because Plaintiff did not wear enough make-up, jewelry,
or walk femininely enough).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 258.
284. Compare Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737-54 (majority opinion), with Bostock
140 S. Ct. at 1765 (Alito, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 1764-65.
286. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2022).
287. The Fifth Circuit held that “reasonably necessary” under the bonafide
occupational qualification requires use of the business necessity test. See Diaz,
442 F.2d at 388 (holding that it was not a bonafide qualification that flight
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Justice Alito foreclosed his own conclusion. Assume for the
sake of argument that history even needs to tell us that such form
of discrimination is race discrimination. By analogy, if history tells
us that this is race discrimination, then it also must be sex
discrimination when you swap out race for sex. How could the same
analysis and logic lead to the conclusion of race discrimination but
not sex discrimination? Perhaps, Justice Alito was implicitly
suggesting that race discrimination deserves more protection under
Title VII than the other protected classes because race
discrimination has been so prevalent throughout history in the
society.
However, Title VII does not provide that race discrimination
is entitled to more or less protection. All the protected classes are
meant to be protected equally.288 Sex is entitled to the same analysis
that race is with one exception under Title VII.289 Congress
explicitly provided when sex could be analyzed differently than
race—the BFOQ—but the BFOQ does not exempt associational
discrimination based on sex, even though Justice Alito hinted that
it does.290 The BFOQ only permits distinctions when it is reasonably
necessary for business operations.291 It is not practical to insinuate
or claim that the sex of an employee’s partner (or religion, race,
color, or national origin for that matter) is relevant to the necessity
of an employer’s business operation. But we can indulge Justice
Alito’s BFOQ remark.292 Instead of race, which is not included in
the BFOQ, for our associational discrimination example, we can use
attendants must be female). Under the business necessity test,
“[d]iscrimination based on sex is valid only when the essence of the business
operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively.”
Id. The Fifth Circuit carefully explained that this is not a business convenience
test. Id. Moreover, the Supreme Court held because of “the restrictive language
of § 703(e) [bonafide occupational qualification], the relevant legislative history,
and the consistent interpretation of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, that the BFOQ . . . was meant to be an extremely narrow
exception.” Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977). The EEOC has also
published guidelines for which situations qualify as bonafide qualification. 1979
Guidebook to Fair Employment Practices (CCH) 310. One likely situation that
employers will generally argue is that the preference of their customers would
not like if they employed gay or transgender people. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes, 884 F.3d at 585, 587. The EEOC in 1979 published that “the refusal to
hire an individual because of . . . the preference of clients or customers” does not
warrant a finding of a bonafide occupation qualification, unless it is necessary
for the authenticity, such as an actor or actress. Id.
288. Eskridge Jr., supra note 27, at 398.
289. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-2(e) (2022).
290. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-2(e) (2022); Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1765
(Alito, J., dissenting).
291. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2022).
292. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1765.
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religion, which is included. Imagine an employer who fires a
Catholic employee for being married to a Protestant. It is clearly
religious discrimination and since both religion and sex are
incorporated into the BFOQ, they would be subject to the same
analysis under Justice Alito’s reasoning.293 This compels the
conclusion that terminating an employee because of the sex of their
partner is inherently discrimination because of sex.
Moreover, Justice Alito’s reasoning that associational
discrimination is historically linked to race discrimination, but not
sex discrimination, fails to account for the extended history of
oppression against women.294 A strong argument can be made that
associational discrimination based on sex has a long history as well.
Women have been oppressed and treated like chattel for thousands
of years.295 It was customary to treat women as the property of their
husband.296 There were times in this country when women could not
vote, own property, seek employment, or gain remedy at law.297
Women were compelled to marry men to obtain societal
protection.298 Discriminating against women who depart from this
historical tradition of marriage to a man only serves to facilitate
and endorse the century-old stigma that women are inferior.299
Therefore, even under Justice Alito’s rationale, associational
discrimination based on the sex of one’s partner would inherently
be sex discrimination because history tells us that forcing women

293. Eskridge Jr., supra note 27, at 398.
294. See Catherine Allgor, Coverture: The Word You Probably Don’t Know
But Should, NAT’L WOMEN’S HIST. MUSEUM (Sept. 4, 2012),
www.womenshistory.org/articles/coverture-word-you-probably-dont-knowshould [perma.cc/JD7G-YN7E] (explaining that under coverture, no female
person has a legal identity); DAVIS HERLIHY, MEDIEVAL CULTURE AND SOCIETY
29 (Harper & Row, 1968) (“[P]unishment [for adultery] being immediate and
inflicted by the injured husband. He cuts off the woman’s hair in the presence
of her kinsfolk, drives her naked from his house and flogs her through the whole
village.”); SUSAN MOELLER OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 74
(1979) (quoting 1 Aristotle, Generation of Animals 728a (“[A] man is male in
virtue of a particular ability, and a female in virtue of a particular inability.”)).
295. Allgor, supra note 294.
296. Id.; OKIN, supra note 294. A husband could not be guilty of raping his
wife in several jurisdictions in the United States well into the later part of the
20th century. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 566.030(1) (Vernon 1989) (“[A] person
commits the crime of forcible rape if he has sexual intercourse with another
person to whom he is not married[.]”); see Joseph Story, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 46 (1834) (explaining that the idea that a woman’s
domicile is that of her husband’s is a result under the common principle “that a
person who is under the power and authority of another possesses no right to
choose a domicile”).
297. Allgor, supra note 294.
298. Id.
299. Eskridge Jr., supra note 27, at 370.
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into marriage with men was an “integral part of preserving the rigid
hierarchical distinction that denominated” women as inferior to
men.300

C. The Judiciary Has Historically Interpreted Sex
Impermissibly Narrow
Since the enactment of Title VII, courts have used the brief
legislative history to infer a narrow characterization of sex.301 For
example, when flight attendants were fired for getting married,
courts described this as marriage discrimination rather than sex
discrimination, and because marriage discrimination is not a
protected class under Title VII, there was no violation.302 When
companies excluded pregnancy related benefits in their disability
plans, this was characterized as pregnancy discrimination, not sex
discrimination.303 And, in Bostock, the Employers argued that the
facts suggested sexual orientation discrimination, not sex
discrimination, and because Title VII does not contain the words
“sexual orientation,” it cannot be protected.304 As Justice Alito
suggested, and other scholars too, perhaps this has just become
nothing more than a shell game – how you characterize the conduct
is dispositive as to whether it receives Title VII protection.305
After all, take the hypothetical in the preceding sub-section –
an employer fires a white male employee because he is married to a
female that is Black. Courts find this to be race discrimination, and
rightfully so.306 But what if we analyzed this as courts have
historically analyzed sex discrimination?307 Instead of broadly
characterizing this conduct as race discrimination, we could
narrowly call this “miscegenosexual” (inter-race relations)
discrimination. Nowhere in Title VII is such a word found, so is this
conduct also unprotected by Title VII? No, it is absolutely
protected.308 Yet, courts tend to analyze sex discrimination
narrowly, whereas the other protected classes of Title VII are given
300. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1765 (Alito, J., dissenting).
301. See Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662 (determining that congress intended a
narrow definition of sex); Smith, 507 F.2d at 1090 (referencing the meager
legislative history behind adding sex to Title VII).
302. See Cooper, 274 F. Supp. at 783 (holding that Title VII does not prohibit
discrimination based on one’s marital status).
303. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 149-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
304. Brief for Petitioners Altitude Express, Inc., and Ray Maynard, supra
note 21, at 16.
305. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1762; Eskridge Jr., supra note 27, at 339-40.
306. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192-95; Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
307. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662.
308. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192-95; Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
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the benefit of a broad interpretation.309
This is not permissible. Title VII holds race, color, religion, sex
and national origin in the same regard, except in the narrow BFOQ
exception discussed above.310 Further, when Congress enacted the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, it expressly rejected the
Supreme Court’s decision in Gilbert that pregnancy discrimination
is not sex discrimination.311 With this legislation, Congress
denounced such a narrow interpretation of sex, specifically citing to
the “broad social objectives of Title VII” as the basis for their
disagreement with the Supreme Court’s rationale and holding.312
Yet, cases arguing that sexual orientation should be included under
sex discrimination have been swiftly dismissed from courts around
the country for more than four decades under a narrow
interpretation of the meaning of sex.313 The very same analysis that
Congress denounced as improper.314
With the resolution of Bostock, there will likely be a surge of
cases that come before the Court related to the protection of gay and
transgender people.315 It is likely that the cases will arise in
educational settings.316 Title IX of the Education Amendments Act
prohibits discrimination “on the basis of sex.”317 The Obama
Administration’s guidance that transgender students are protected
under Title IX was rejected by the Trump Administration.318 It
could be possible with the ruling in Bostock that gay and
transgender students will be protected. There are also open-ended
questions as to how gay and transgender people are protected in the
employment context when an employer asserts a defense under
RFRA. If an employer can show that hiring a gay or transgender

309. Compare Loving, 388 U.S. at 11, with Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1090
(distinguishing discrimination based on one’s grooming standards from sex
discrimination).
310. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-2(e) (2022).
311. Franklin, supra note 4, at 1366-67; H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 2.
312. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 2.
313. De Santis, 608 F.2d at 333; Evans, 850 F.3d at 1257.
314. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 2.
315. See John Kruzel, Supreme Court takes up wedding site designer’s case
refusing
gay
couples,
THE
HILL
(Feb.
22,
2022),
www.thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/595293-supreme-court-takes-upfight-over-wedding-website-designers-refusal [perma.cc/ZHL4-RQ3E].
316. Brief for the Petitioner R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, supra note
104, at 45-48.
317. Sharita Gruberg, Beyond Bostock: The Future of LGBTQ Civil Rights,
CTR.
FOR
A M.
PROGRESS
(Aug.
26,
2020),
www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbtqrights/reports/2020/08/26/489772/beyond-bostock-future-lgbtq-civil-rights/#fn489772-10 [perma.cc/B768-XCK5].
318. Id.
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person is a substantial burden on his religious beliefs, who
prevails?319 The resolutions to these potential issues are beyond the
scope of this Note. However, the manner in which courts resolve
these issues is not.
The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that the judiciary
has historically analyzed sex discrimination in an unreasonably
narrow scope under Title VII and asymmetrically compared to the
other protected classes of Title VII. When courts have done this,
they base their rationale on an abstract conclusion about what the
legislature may have intended based on the legislative history that
many judges admit is inconclusive.320 As the issues described above
begin to materialize into litigation, the appropriate methodology to
resolve these issues is to analyze sex discrimination in the same
way that cases of religion or race are analyzed. Even if Title VII’s
main goal was to target race discrimination, that is no excuse to
afford more protection to race because sex appears alongside race,
color, religion, and national origin.321 It can reasonably be argued
that Congress intended to protect against sex discrimination to the
same extent as race discrimination.

V.

CONCLUSION

Before the Supreme Court decided Bostock on June 15, 2020, a
person could be discriminated against for the sex of their partner or
for identifying with a sex they were not assigned at birth.322 The
impact of the Court’s holding has marked a significant shift in
employment law that will drastically change the workplace and will
protect individuals from discrimination based on their sex. For
decades, the judiciary has narrowly construed the meaning of sex,
which has resulted in the preservation of a discriminatory work
environment that has fostered myopic stereotypes unrelated to
work-based merit.323 Make no mistake, a narrow characterization
of sex has harmed many others in addition to gay and transgender
individuals.324 Countless individuals have been subjected to
humiliation, harassment, intimidation, and discrimination in the
workplace for no other reason but their sex. It has resulted in the
judiciary preserving the attitude that underscores what the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 set out to eradicate – discrimination based on
319. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2022).
320. Smith, 507 F.2d at 1090; Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662.
321. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662.
322. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1736.
323. De Santis, 608 F.2d at 333; Evans, 850 F.3d at 1257; Cooper, 274 F.
Supp. at 783; Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662.
324. Oncale, 523 U.S. 75; Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125.
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immutable characteristics in order to ensure a merit-based
workplace.325
The decision in Bostock is a landmark holding that implements
an analysis of sex discrimination that promotes the overarching
policy of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.326 It is the form of analysis
that Congress has endorsed and directed.327 Yet, the dissenters
label this as a statutory amendment by the judiciary.328 But, a broad
interpretation of the meaning of sex is no less permissible than a
broad interpretation of race, religion, color, or national origin. In
fact, an asymmetrical analysis of sex that is disproportionately
narrower relative to the other protected classes of Title VII more
closely resembles a judicial amendment than analyzing sex
discrimination the same way that race, religion, color, or national
origin are analyzed.

325. Eskridge Jr., supra note 27, at 336.
326. Id.
327. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 2.
328. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754-55 (Alito, J., dissenting); Bostock, 140 S. Ct.
at 1822-23 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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